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This paper provides a variety of evidence that shows that in Asia, aid leveraged 
private investment in the long run, while in Africa the correlation between aid and 
domestic investment was at best ambiguous. Aid in Africa was diametrically opposite 
to that of Asia in terms of the amounts the countries received, the sector compositions, 
the size of individual projects, and the intensity of donor involvement. The sharp 
contrast in aid effectiveness between Asia and Africa could be attributed at least in 
part to those differences in the modality of aid delivery. Based on the above analysis, 
the paper concludes with a few suggestions that could link aid more closely to private 
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I. Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of aid in raising economic growth has been a subject of voluminous 
research. Yet, a survey of the literature has failed to find any empirical relationship linking 
aid to growth that is sufficiently robust to serve as a guide for policy makers or to give 
comfort to the public that their tax money has been or will be well spent.  
 
Indeed, the recent research casts doubts on the earlier findings on which much of the current 
policies of the multilateral and bilateral aid agencies are based. For example, Hansen and 
Tarp (1999), Easterly and Roodman (2004) and others credibly challenged the proposition 
advanced by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the World Bank (1998), that aid is effective in 
raising economic growth in countries where policies are sound. Similarly, Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) question the robustness of the claim of Clemens, et al., (2004) that 
“short-impact” aid has been effective for growth.
2 Roodman (2004), systematically testing 
the statistical robustness of the existing hypotheses, found no robust relationship, except a 
negative relation between aid effectiveness and geography (tropics) of the recipient country.
3   
 
However, the absence of statistically reliable correlation between economic growth and aid 
does not mean that aid has been universally ineffective, or the existing aid effectiveness 
stories contain no truth. Rather, it means, “the entire enterprise of running cross-country 
growth regressions may be plagued by noise in data, which makes it hard to establish any 
relationship even if they actually exist ... If noise in data plagues all findings, then strong 
claims about aid effectiveness based on cross country evidence are unwarranted (Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005), p. 19).”  
 
The above analyses assume that aid is a homogeneous variable, namely one dollar of aid 
would have the same impact on growth or investment, irrespective of how it was delivered. 
In this paper, we show that modalities of aid delivery in Asia and those of Africa were 
substantially different. On this basis, we introduce aid as region specific variables and run the 
conventional GMM regressions. We then complement these regressions with a variety of  
other evidence comparing aid to Asia and that to Africa.  
 
Our main findings are as follows:  
 
a.  In general, aid does matter to foreign and domestic investments. But the structure in 
which aid has impacted on investment flows appears systematically different between 
East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).   
 
                                                 
2 As defined by Clemens et al., (2004), this consists of economic infrastructure, real sector projects, and budget 
support. 
3 For a comprehensive survey of literature, see Gupta, et al., (2005). - 5 - 
b.  In East Asia, aid was small but combined with other public interventions in a strategic 
design specifically aimed at promoting private investment. Aid thus leveraged a much 
larger amount of private investment, and made a modest yet significant contribution 
to growth in the region. 
  
c.  In SSA, the relationship between aid and domestic investment is at best ambiguous. 
Given its focus on budgetary support and social sectors, the amount of aid money 
spent on non-tradables was extremely large. Aid thus raised the relative price of non-
tradables—i.e., causing real exchange rate appreciation—exerted upward pressures 
on inflation, or kept real interest rates high, all of which worked against private 
investment. 
  
d.  In aid to Africa, the balance may have shifted too far in favor of social sector and 
budgetary support at the expense of economic infrastructure and real sector projects. 
Aid to encourage good policies is useful and necessary, but where aid has been 
already very large, policy support should be delivered in a way not to add further 
demand pressures on non-tradables. An approach where aid is more directly linked to 
catalyzing private investment should be considered.  
 
Section II provides econometric evidence that shows that the impact of aid on investment in 
the recipient country was different between East Asia and Africa. Given the empirical results, 
we attribute the difference to aid modalities. Section III then elaborates upon the 
characteristics of modalities of aid in Asia, and look into the relationship between aid and 
investment in the region. Section IV discusses aid in Africa. Section V aims to draw some 
implications of these findings on effective aid modalities in the African context. A brief 
observation concludes the paper. Technical data and econometric issues are discussed in 
Annex.  
 
II. Does Modality Matter?  
 
The central question of this paper is whether aid has a positive impact on growth and/or 
investment, and if so, whether such impact is different between two contrasting regions: East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
4 Although aid agencies deliver aid in different forms and for 
                                                 
4 The findings of Clemens (2002) are not encouraging. He stipulated that the fundamental 
rationale for reallocating world capital via public intervention (i.e., aid) is either (a) to 
substitute for private capital where international capital market failures prevented capital to 
flow to developing countries; or (b) to complement private capital where domestic market 
failures left otherwise productive investments unfinanced. He found that neither domestic nor 
foreign flows of private capital respond positively to past impulses of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) credit. He also found that both bilateral flows 
and IMF lending are negatively associated with subsequent private capital inflows. 
 
 - 6 - 
different purposes, in theory, it may not really matter what aid agencies assist in recipient 
countries, because aid money might be fundgeble if it were not accompanied by relevant 
policy reforms (e.g., Gupta et al., 2003; Odedokun, 2004). In reality, however, on the more 
practical levels it seems uncomplicated to differentiate aid among regions—as it impacts 
growth—given the marked differences in growth performance particularly between East and 
Southeast Asia and Africa after several decades of foreign aid. Aid modalities must be of 
necessity reflected in the channels through which aid is delivered, as shown in Iimi and 
Ojima (2008). 
 
Thus, we simply hypothesize that aid is different across geographical regions in terms of its 
effect on investment, in particular in attracting direct investment from abroad and catalyzing 
private domestic investment. As will be shown below, in fact, aid in Asia and that in Africa 
were diametrically opposite to each other in its modalities—namely, the size of individual 
projects, the sect oral allocations, and the intensity of donor involvement.  
 
We run a series of regressions to test the responses of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
gross domestic investment (GDI) to aid inflows in developing countries, with data from more 
than 100 aid recipient countries for the period 1972–2003. Following the conventional 
treatment, the sample period is divided into 8 four-year sub-periods, and the averages of four-
year sub-periods of each variable were deployed as observations. Since all dependent and 
independent variables are potentially endogenous, one of the conventional Generalized 
Method of Movements (GMM) estimators, the Arrelano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
estimator, was employed.  
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we regress foreign or domestic investment on aid, 
differentiating its coefficients across regions, i.e., Asia,
5 Sub-Saharan Africa and others. In 
this specification, if aid to Asia is not qualitatively different from that of Africa as a 
determinant of investment, the estimated coefficients for the aid variables should be broadly 
the same in magnitude and the statistical significance.  
 
Our results indicate that aid to Asia is qualitatively different from that to Africa. Despite 
some potential weakness in statistical robustness, they confirm that the impact of aid on 
domestic and foreign investment in Asia is positive and significant, while that of Africa is 
ambiguous. 
 
•  First, we introduce aid as one variable, assuming that aid was the same across 
regions as it impacted GDI. With gross domestic investment (GDI) as dependent 
variable, in the linear specification, the estimated coefficients on aid are small but 
significant (Table 1). In the case of FDI, the lagged aid variable turned out to be a 
                                                 
5 Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong SDR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Viet Nam. - 7 - 
plausible determinant of FDI in the non-linear specification (Table 2). However, 
the estimated coefficient is small and only weakly significant. 
 
•  We then introduce aid as region-specific variables. With GDI as dependent 
variable, the coefficients for aid in Asia are statistically different from those for 
Africa in linear specification. In the non-linear models, the aid coefficients for 
Asia are clearly different from those for Africa, even more so than the case of the 
linear specification. The test statistics for this difference  ) 4 (
2 χ  is 31.85. In non-
linear specification, when aid is introduced as one variable, the correlation is 
statistically insignificant. 
 
•  In the FDI equations, the overall explanatory power improves when the aid 
coefficients are allowed to vary across regions. In addition, in the non-linear 
specification, we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on aid in 
Asia is equal to the corresponding figure for Africa. The relevant test statistics is 
estimated at  53 . 10 ) 4 (
2 = χ .  
 
 
III. Aid in East Asia 
 
1. Aid in East Asia was small and mostly for infrastructure. 
 
The amount of aid that East Asian countries received was small, compared with the norms 
for African countries that we are now accustomed to. Annual aid flows to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand ranged mostly in ½–2 percent of GDP in 
the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s (Figure 1).
6 7 Even in terms of U.S. dollars, aid to East Asia 
was small relative to that of several African countries. Aid to Thailand was about 
US$600 million per annum through the 1980’s, one half of aid that Tanzania now receives. 
The Tanzanian economy is only one fifth of that of Thailand. 
 
In East Asia, aid was mostly for infrastructure and real sector projects (Table 3). Such 
projects, for instance, comprised more than 90 percent of total assistance in Malaysia (on a 
commitment basis). The average among the above-mentioned four countries was 70 percent. 
In contrast, program assistance was very limited. Indonesia and the Philippines received 
structural adjustment program assistance, but it amounted to only US$1.3 billion (in 
                                                 
6 In this note, aid is a gross concept (i.e., disbursements of grants and confessional loans), and does not include 
debt forgiveness and capitalization of interest payments, which the Organization of Economic Corporation & 
Development (OECD) classify as part of official development assistance (ODA). 
7 For Indonesia, reliable GDP data are not available for the 1960’s. Korea received a large amount of aid in the 
decade following the Korean War, but it fell sharply thereafter. - 8 - 
constant 2003 dollars) for both countries combined through the period 1975–90. In other 
words, it was on average less than US$50 million per year per country.  
 
In East Asia, donors engaged in a few large projects. The size of the projects was on average 
US$7–8 million, with more than 10 percent of them exceeding US$20 million. Each major 
donor on average undertook only 4 projects per year in each country during 1973–89. As 
seen below, this is in stark contrast to donor activities in Africa. 
 
Of particular note, in East Asia Japan was by far the largest donor, providing 40–50 percent 
of total donor assistance to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. The United 
States provided 10–20 percent, and other bilateral donors offered a much smaller share. The 
multilateral development banks played a more modest role, with their financing equal to 4–
5 percent of total aid flows.  
 
2. Aid leveraged private capital in Asia.  
 
It is well known that the phenomenal growth in East Asia in the 1970’s and the 1980’s was 
driven by the massive accumulation of capital, in which FDI played an important part. 
According to IFC (2005b), “the success of China, India, and the East Asian tigers ... has 
helped build a consensus that private firms produce the new jobs and economic growth for 
poverty reduction. So, if the aim is pro-poor growth (and it is), there is no substitute for 
bringing a better business climate to places where poor people already live or can easily 
move.” The range of instruments offered by aid agencies has expanded to official 
concessional loans, dispute resolution, performance-based grants, loans to the private sector, 
insurance and guarantees for private investors, equity investments in the private sector, and 
an array of stand-alone technical assistance.  
 
We performed a series of GMM regressions for 12 major aid recipient countries in Asia.
8 It is 
noteworthy that the small sample size is a major problem in relying on the Arrelano-Bond 
estimators. However, having established aid as a significant determinant of investment in 
Asia with a sufficiently large sample above, we sought region-specific relations between aid 
and investment, focusing on data from the region only. 
 
Our estimation results indicate that in Asia, one dollar of aid led to more than one dollar of 
investment, and that this positive impact of aid was subject to a diminishing return to scale. 
Although our results were not completely satisfactory, the correlation between aid and 
investment was fairly robust against variations in specifications. 
 
•  Table 4 presents GMM estimates with FDI as a dependent variable. It shows that 
if the relation between FDI and aid is assumed linear, the estimated coefficients 
                                                 
8 Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong SDR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Viet Nam. - 9 - 
on aid—both contemporaneous and lagged—are statistically insignificant, with or 
without non-aid explanatory variables such as population (proxy for market size), 
per capita GDP, and telephone network (proxy for infrastructure). However, if the 
relation between FDI and aid is assumed non-linear, the coefficients on both 
contemporaneous and lagged aid turned out positive and statistically significant. 
As expected, both are subject to a diminishing return to scale. These non-linear 
estimates indicate that aid of one percent of GDP would lead to FDI of about 
1½ percent of GDP, once its impacts are fully absorbed.
9  
 
•  Table 5 presents our GMM estimates with GDI as a dependent variable. As in the 
case of FDI, the non-aid explanatory variables do not seem to add much in the 
estimation. In all specifications, the correlation between GDI and aid with a lag of 
one period was strongly positive and significant. The estimated coefficient on 
contemporaneous aid was insignificant but negative, and thus the relation between 
the contemporaneous aid variable and the lagged one is unstable. However, in all 
specifications, the impact of lagged aid dominates the contemporaneous effect 
over the medium term. Overall, the non-linear specification without non-aid 
variables appears to be more satisfactory than the others, although this 
specification satisfies the non-autocorrelation hypothesis only weakly—at the 5 
percent significance level. The estimated equation suggests that aid of 1 percent 
of GDP would lead to GDI of some 4–5 percent of GDP, once its impact is fully 
absorbed over five periods or 20 years (see Figure 2). 
 
 
3. Impact of Japanese aid may not have been so different from that of other donors. 
 
In Asia, Japanese aid primarily financed large infrastructure projects to assist the private 
sector development and to encourage private investment. Typically, each project combined 
several instruments of assistance in a package. It consisted of (a) concessional loans for 
financing infrastructure; (b) grants for technical assistance for transfer of know-how; and (c) 
non-concessional loans to finance other elements of the project that are commercially viable 
but too risky for private enterprises alone. In addition, to leverage private capital, the package 
often included co-financing with private financial institutions, as well as equity participation 
and official guarantees to encourage direct investment by foreign firms. Combining these 
instruments of assistance in a package—designed specifically for promoting private 
investment—is characteristic of Japanese aid.
  
 
                                                 
9 The addition of non-aid explanatory variables does not seem to enhance the explanatory 
power much, as the coefficients of these variables turned out to be statistically insignificant. 
This probably suggests that they were not a good proxy of the factors they were meant to 
represent. - 10 - 
An example of such Japanese assistance is the industrial development project in the Eastern 
Seaboard of Thailand over the 1980’s. In this project, concessional loans were extended for 
the construction of ports, roads, railways and industrial parks. Non-concessional loans were 
provided to finance more commercial elements of the project, e.g., power plants and natural 
gas and oil pipelines, and co-financing with private financial institutions was arranged for 
them. Trade finance and partial guarantees of equity investment were also offered to facilitate 
direct investment from Japanese firms in this industrial development area.  
 
In other projects, Japanese aid was designed to pave the way for privatization and private 
ownership of public utilities. In the Phu My Power Generation project in Viet Nam, to 
augment the country’s supply capacity of electric power through having its new power 
generation plants owned and operated by the private sector, the Japanese agency, together 
with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, provided concessional loans for 
strengthening power transmission capacity. This is because the power transmission and 
distribution segment—which was to remain in the public sector—was considered a pre-
requisite for private ownership of power generation plants. The Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) also extended concessional loans to upgrade the equipment of the first of 
three power generation plants to be built. The successful operation of the first power plant 
reduced the risk of investing in a power plant. Then, the second and third power plants were 
constructed with equity investment of private firms and co-financing of private banks.  
 
The previous research suggests that in Asia, Japanese aid not only promoted FDI from Japan 
but also contributed to local business development and direct investment of non-Japanese 
firms. The International Development Center of Japan (IDCJ) (1996) reports that Japanese 
aid substantially raised the internal rate of return of FDI from both Japanese and other 
foreign companies. Using large-scale macro econometric models developed for Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand, it estimated that the internal rate of return to Japanese FDI in 1972–
92 was 25.8 percent, but had it not been for Japanese ODA, it would have been 16.3 percent. 
The impact on the rate of return was similar for FDI from the United States. The IDCJ (1996) 
attributes 16.1 percent of Thailand’s exports in 1992 to FDI during the preceding 20 years.
10 
All in all, the cumulative impact of FDI during 1972–92 is estimated at 9.5 percentage points 
of GDP in 1992. If there had not been Japanese aid, the impact would have been 3.6 percent 
of GDP. 
 
But, was Japanese aid different from that of the other donors in its impact on private 
investment, particularly FDI, in recipient countries? To help answer this question, we 
performed GMM regressions of FDI from Japan or FDI from all countries over aid from 
Japan and that of the other donors. Our analysis can provide some pieces of evidence; the 
                                                 
10 According to Fukao, et al., (2003), manufacturing subsidiaries of U.S firms in East Asia sold 28 percent of 
their products to the United States and 33 percent to other export markets in 1999. The comparable figures for 
the U.S. subsidiaries in Latin America were 22 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Similarly, manufacturing 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms in East Asia sold 26 percent of total to Japan and other export markets, each. In 
contrast, Japanese subsidiaries in Latin America sold 77 percent in local markets. - 11 - 
results may indicate that the impact of Japanese aid may have been larger but only slightly 
(Table 6). 
 
•  Our GMM estimate with non-linear specification shows that Japanese aid impacted 
FDI from Japan positively, but that correlation was not so strong. Aid of the other 
donors did not affect Japanese FDI significantly. 
 
•  As regards the impact on FDI from all countries, again in non-linear specification, the 
estimated coefficient of contemporaneous Japanese aid was large and strongly 
significant. In this case, the coefficient of lagged Japanese aid was negative but 
insignificant. The impact of aid from the other donors was also positive, although this 
correlation was statistically less significant.  
 
The above estimates suggest that the catalytic effects of aid on private investment in Asia 
may not have been a quality unique to Japanese aid. This result appears, broadly speaking, in 
conflict with the existing evidence, such as Economic Planning Agency (2001). This study 
expanded the sample base of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Hansen and Terp (2000) to 
cover 121 countries in 1960–97, and performed growth regressions on unbalanced panel data 
using the weighted Generalized Least Squares (GLS) technique. The estimated equation has 
a high explanatory power and indicates that Japanese concessional loan assistance was 
considerably more effective in raising growth than other forms of aid of all donors combined 
(Table 7).
11 While results of this kind of exercise have to be seen with a grain of salt, the 
conflicting outcomes suggest that the issue should be examined further, perhaps with a case 




IV. Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
1. Aid to Africa was large and focused on social sectors. 
 
In many ways, aid to Africa was diametrically opposite to that of East Asia. First, aid has 
been very large in most African countries. Annual gross aid flows were on average 
equivalent to 13 percent of GDP during 1980–2003 (the median was 11 percent of GDP). 
Twelve countries received aid equivalent to more than 20 percent of GDP. Fourteen countries 
got aid of more than US$500 million per annum (Figure 3). Only in nine countries, aid was 
less than US$100 million despite the fact that the economies of most African countries are 
small. 
 
                                                 
11 Kawasaki (2002) developed a CGE (computable general equilibrium) model of global trade with regional and 
sectoral data for 1996–2000. It estimates that by expanding the capital stock and hence the production capacity, 
Japanese ODA raised the permanent level of real GDP by 0.2–0.7 percent of GDP.  - 12 - 
Second, the efficiency of bilateral donor operations was low. This is because many major 
bilateral donors were active in practically all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly with a 
very small budget, and each of them engaged in a large number of extremely small projects 
and programs in each country. For example, for Netherlands, the median of annual aid flows 
to a recipient country was only US$5.7 million. It provided aid to 44 out of 50 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It had on average 14 projects per country per year, and the median of 
value of projects was a tiny US$64,000 (Table 8).
12 Diankov et al., (2005) and Acharya et al., 
(2004) cite the fragmentation and proliferation of donor assistance as a key problem lowering 
the effectiveness of aid in the region.  
  
Third, aid in Africa was predominantly for social sector projects, budgetary support and 
program assistance. In Africa, the share of social sector projects was, understandably, always 
high compared with East Asia. Still, in the 1980’s, the balance between infrastructure and 
real sector projects on one hand, and social sector projects and program assistance on the 
other was about fifty-fifty. This balance shifted dramatically in the past two decades. 
In 2000–03, infrastructure and real sector projects comprised only 21 percent of total 
(excluding debt relief), with the remainder going to social sector projects and program 
assistance (70 percent) and emergency aid (10 percent), as shown in Table 9.  
 
Did Japan adopt in Africa the approach that its officials believed was successful in Asia? 
Japan seems to have tried to do so when it began its official assistance to Africa in the 1970’s. 
However, data reveal that subsequently, the focus shifted from infrastructure to structural 
adjustment and then to education and health, in order to conform to the priorities of the donor 
community. Then, debt cancellation came to be accepted as a common practice. Japan 
acquiesced to this policy, but insisting that it would not extend concessional loans to a 
country that had sought outright cancellation of its debt. As a result, most African countries 
became ineligible to receive Japanese yen loans. This meant that Japan lost one of the main 
instruments that were central in its aid policy in East Asia. 
 
Moreover, beginning in 1990, Japanese aid to Africa fell steadily, reflecting the erosion of 
political support for ODA as well as the difficult fiscal situation that had emerged. By the 
early 2000’s, Japanese aid halved to the equivalent of US$679 million per year, i.e., only 
0.01 percent of Japan’s GNI. At the same time, Japanese aid apparently became less 
concentrated geographically in the region, with its aid money spread rather evenly among the 
recipients. As a result, the amount of aid that each African country received from Japan 
became smaller over time (Figure 4).  
 
In the early 2000’s, the median of Japanese aid for African countries was only US$6 million 
per year. Even the five largest recipients received only US$40 million to US$70 million per 
                                                 
12 In contrast, Japan had a similar number of projects in its aid to the countries in East Asia, but for an economy 
[100] times larger. The median of the value of projects of Japanese aid was US$10 million, which was 50 times 
that of the UK’s in Africa. - 13 - 
annum. Japan’s aid typically amounted to 0.2–0.6 percent of GDP, and was greater than 
1 percent of GDP only in several of the smallest of small countries. This was very small 
compared with the Japanese comprehensive aid programs implemented to finance large 
infrastructure projects in East Asia.
13  
 
2. Growth effect of the social program aid approach is not apparent. 
 
Proponents of aid for Africa have been buoyed by the recent upturn in economic indicators in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular in countries where aid has been extremely large (e.g., 
Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, and Ethiopia). The acceleration in economic growth, 
combined with the deceleration in inflation, is impressive, and the country authorities as well 
as the bilateral and multilateral development agencies should be congratulated for these 
achievements.  
 
However, the effectiveness of aid can or should not be assessed in terms of short-run 
outcome. Aid can almost always boost economic activity in the short-run by providing 
demand for industries operating with excess capacity. Crops that would otherwise have been 
kept in subsistence farming could be brought to markets for sale, in response to domestic 
demand generated by aid. In most African countries, a period of good economic performance 
is often followed by a bad one. At any given time, good performers are mixed with not-so-
good ones. The issue is not a short-term impact, but rather whether aid leads to a self-
sustained long-term improvement of growth performance.  
 
A long-term positive impact of aid on economic growth and broader development indicators 
is not apparent in Africa. For example, if we observe the relationship between the amount of 
aid and the extent of improvement in HDI, or the increase of per capita GDP, of recipient 
countries over the period 1980–2003, it does not appear that aid mattered much. The aid-
weighted average improvement in the HDI of African countries is not higher than the simple 
average. The aid-weighted average increase of per capita GDP is lower than the simple 
average for the same period. These results hold even if we exclude from the sample the 
countries heavily afflicted by HIV/AIDS or the conflict cases (as defined by countries where 
emergency aid was more than 30 percent of total). See Table 10. A simple cross-section 
regression shows that the correlation between HDI (annual average percentage change 
in 1980–2003) and aid (ratio to GDP in the same period) is positive but insignificant.  
 
Is there strong evidence that “aid worked” in countries where economic policies are good, as 
contended by Burnside and Dollar (2000)? Not really, if the World Bank/IMF structural 
adjustment programs were to signify “good policies.” Let us illustrate. The countries that 
                                                 
13 Japan did not do well in its aid to Africa, if the outcome is measured in terms of the improvement of the 
Human Development Index (HDI) of the recipient countries. The average HDI, weighted by the share of the 
recipient in total Japanese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, improved by 6 percent in one decade from 1980 to 1990, 
and 1.6 percent from 1980 to 2000, but this improvement was lower than the corresponding figure of any of the 
other major donors. The average for Japan was also lower than the simple average of all African countries - 14 - 
received aid under structural adjustment programs continuously during the 1990’s (in at least 
8 of 11 years) raised HDI on average by 5.8 percent over the decade (Table 11). This is lower 
than the average improvement of HDI of Sub-Saharan African countries over the same 
period (excluding four countries in Southern Africa heavily inflicted by HIV/AIDS, i.e., 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa). The countries that received structural 
adjustment program aid in the 1990’s did not get much of that aid in the 1980’s. Yet these 
countries achieved a greater improvement of HDI in the 1980’s. 
 
This finding does not mean that good policies are not needed, but rather the good policies 
embodied in the structural adjustment programs were apparently insufficient to make aid 
result in higher HDI or economic growth. 
 
Aid can raise growth permanently only if it leads to higher capital formation, particularly the 
private capital. Otherwise, dependency on aid would be perpetual, and development would 
not be sustainable. 
 
3. There is no robust empirical evidence that aid raised private investment in Africa. 
 
In Africa, apparently, larger aid is associated with lower private investment. Figure 5 depicts 
the simple correlation between the average ratio of private investment to GDP and the 
average aid to GDP ratio for all Sub-Saharan African countries, for which data are available 
in 1990–99.  
 
The observations in the figure include the countries where there is obviously no causal 
relationship between the private investment ratio and aid or the cases where the causality 
runs from high private investment to low aid. For example, in Mauritius, while economic 
performance was good—and the private investment ratio was high by African standards—aid 
was small. In Angola, Namibia, and several others, private investment was driven primarily 
for enclave operations for exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies, and 
hence was not affected much by aid. In Liberia, Burundi, Congo (former Zaire) and some 
others, private investment was non-existent almost over the sample period, due to the 
ongoing conflicts and insecurity. Excluding these cases from the sample, a simple regression 
of private investment per GDP on the aid-to-GDP ratio—the variables being the average 
for 1995–2003—generated the coefficient of -0.17 with a t statistic of -1.91.  
 
This regression does not of course establish causality, and generally there are many statistical 
difficulties to do so. However, the key question for policy makers is not so much if aid would 
reduce investment, but rather whether they could reasonably presume that aid would result in 
an increase in investment. In this regard, Easterly and Dollar (1999) examined 35 African 
countries, and observed that (a) no African country satisfied the prediction that investment 
would increase with aid at least one for one; and (b) 8 countries showed a positive and 
significant relationship between aid and investment, but 12 countries showed a negative and - 15 - 
significant relationship. The implication is that the history does not give us a firm basis to 
expect that aid would lead to higher investment.
14 
 
The results of our GMM estimates support the view that in Africa the relationship between 
aid and investment is ambiguous.  
 
•  We experimented with a number of empirical models to test the relationship between 
aid and FDI, and they suggested no meaningful relationship (Table 12). Only possible 
exception was the linear specification, where the correlation was weakly significant 
and negative. These results are consistent with the general perception that FDI in 
Africa is largely confined to the exploitation of natural resources in enclave 
operations (with a few notable exceptions such as Lethoto, Mauritius and Seychelles).  
 
•  The linear specifications of the aid-GDI relationship yielded the positive and 
significant coefficients of both contemporaneous and lagged aid (Table 13). However, 
these coefficients are small, compared with the Asian case. Aid of one percent of 
GDP would lead to GDI of only 0.5 percent of GDP over time (Figure 6). Moreover, 
if we assume that the relation between aid and domestic investment is non-linear (as 
is generally expected), our GMM estimates show that aid was not a significant 
determinant of GDI, with or without the non-aid explanatory variables. The estimated 
coefficients on non-aid variables were either insignificant or a wrong sign.  
 
The estimate of the aid-GDI long-run multiplier of 0.5 does not necessarily suggest that aid 
crowds out private investment in Africa. Not all of aid was intended to increase public 
investment. Indeed, a large majority of aid in Africa was most likely meant to augment 
public consumption, rather than investment. Moreover, aid could have substituted for public 
investment that would have been funded by domestic resources. However, in combination 
with the estimation results on FDI, it seems fair to conclude that if aid played a role to 
catalyze private investment, it must have been very weak. 
 
4. Aid could have hindered private investment. 
 
Although the empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive, it is conceivable that aid has 
weakened private investment in Africa. There are reasons to support this inference:  
 
First, the supply response to aid was limited, both in the short- and long-run. 
 
•  In Africa, the aid policy of the international community has been based on the 
premise that if macroeconomic policies are sound, the economy is liberalized, and a 
                                                 
14 According to IFC (2005), Djankov et al., find that ODA as a whole indirectly retards growth by increasing 
government consumption and reducing total investment as a share of GDP. On the other hand, Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) finds that gross domestic investment (as a share of GDP) responds positively to aid.   - 16 - 
good progress is made toward good governance, then the environment for private 
investment would improve and the private sector would naturally take off. Based on 
this premise, donors increased budget and balance of payment support to promote 
structural adjustment and other policy-based programs. In the end, however, the 
promised take-off was not observed in general. After nearly ten years of continuous, 
successful structural adjustment and US$18 billion of aid (in constant 2003 dollars) to 
support it, private investment remains pitifully low. The average private investment-
to-GDP ratio for countries that implemented structural adjustment was 12.6 percent 
in 2003, which was not much different from the level in 1995 or the simple average 
of all Sub-Saharan African countries in 2003 (Table 14). 
 
•  Given the focus on budgetary aid and the priority attached to education and other 
social services, aid did not help much in augmenting capital formation. Only 
20 percent of aid in 1980–2003 was used for economic infrastructure and real sector 
projects. Moreover, there is ample anecdotal evidence that much of the aid for 
infrastructure did not translate to permanent increase in physical capital. Often it was 
not well maintained for the lack of adequate funding and local commitment.  
 
•  The weight of the empirical literature suggests that in Africa, public investment—
much of which was aid—was not positively correlated to economic growth even with 
a low degree of significance (e.g., Deverajan et al., 2001). If aid were to have had a 
significant supply response, intuitively it would be difficult to understand why per 
capita income in Africa remained so low after decades of massive aid.   
 
Second, aid-financed government consumption of non-tradables was large in most 
countries in Africa. In Asia, aid was predominantly for infrastructure and used primarily to 
finance machineries, supplies and equipment that were imported from abroad. More than 
80 percent of Japanese aid in 1975–85 was spent for directly financing imports (DAC 
database). To the extent aid money is used directly to finance imports, it does not affect the 
domestic demand-supply balance. In contrast, in Africa aid was primarily for budget support, 
program aid and social sector projects, a large majority of which was spent locally 
particularly on non-tradables. Aid in this category was more than 5 percent of GDP (on a 
commitment basis) in most African countries, and exceeded 10 percent of GDP for several, 
in 1995–2003.  
 
Third, given the limited supply response, the ensuing excess demand for non-tradables 
caused either an increase in the relative price of non-tradables (i.e., real exchange rate 
appreciation), inflation, and/or an increase in real interest rates, all of which affected 
private investment negatively. Let us illustrate:   
 
•  Suppose that the government did not adjust fiscal or monetary policy in response to 
aid inflows. Then, the demand for non-tradables would increase by the amount of aid-
financed government consumption. The relative price of non-tradables would then 
rise—i.e., the real exchange rate would appreciate—enough for the private sector to - 17 - 
reduce its consumption of non-tradables by the amount of aid-financed government 
consumption and increase the consumption of tradables correspondingly. Thus, the 
current account would worsen by the amount of aid, leaving international reserves 
and hence reserve money unchanged. With money supply unchanged, the overall 
price level will not change. 
 
•  The government could mitigate or avoid real exchange rate appreciation by 
monetizing aid inflows (i.e., buying foreign exchange and injecting reserve money) 
and inflating the economy. For instance, if the real value of non-aid related 
government spending on non-tradables is reduced—via inflation—by the amount of 
aid-financed government consumption of non-tradables, the demand-supply balance 
in the domestic non-tradables market would be unaffected, and hence no change in 
the relative price of non-tradables, i.e., the real exchange rate. The nominal exchange 
rate would depreciate pari pasu with the price of non-tradables. 
 
•  The government could also avoid real appreciation (and inflation), if it sold 
government securities to the private sector to raise the latter’s savings. A reduction in 
current private consumption of nontradables could cancel out aid-financed public 
consumption of non-tradables. The private consumption of tradables would also be 
reduced, and hence the current account would improve and international reserves rise. 
In this case, however, the cost for the economy would be an increase in real interest 
rates.  
   
Table 15 shows the interplay of aid flows and the related variables for the African countries 
that received budget support, program aid and social sector projects more than 5 percent of 
GDP per year (a proxy for aid money spent on non-tradables). In general, it is difficult to 
directly trace the aid impact on the real exchange rate, inflation and real interest rates. 
However, there are several typical cases where the countries experienced either significant 
real appreciation (e.g., Benin), a double-digit inflation (e.g., Ghana and Mozambique), high 
real interest rates (Gambia and Uganda), high inflation and real interest rates (Madagascar, 
Malawi and Tanzania), or inflation, high real interest rates and real exchange rate 
appreciation (Zambia).  
 
The IMF (2005) observes that there is no evidence of real exchange rate appreciation in 
response to a surge in aid flows in Africa. We should be careful not to conclude from this 
observation alone that there was no aid-related Dutch decease syndrome or no other harmful 
effects. Data are subject to large margin of errors in most African countries. It is well known 
that the exchange rates are subject to a lot of noise and could well deviate from economic 
fundamentals for some time. If there were large capital outflows concomitant to an increase 
in aid flows (as seen in the cases of aid surge in recent years), no appreciation pressures 
would be expected. After all, as per the IMF (2005), the private investment to GDP ratio fell 
over the period of aid surge in all cases. 
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V. Implications for Effective Donor Assistance 
 
A key lesson from East Asia is that if aid is to be effective in the long-run, it would have to 
lead to private capital formation, both domestic and foreign. Private-to-private flows, 
particularly FDI, directly boost growth and relieve poverty. Aid would have to be an integral 
element of recipient government’s development strategy, which would focus on the 
mobilization of private capital. An objective of aid should be to assist the private sector 
development, and its effectiveness should be judged to a large extent by its impact on private 
investment over the medium to long term. 
 
However, even if such private sector development strategy was pursued in Africa, no 
immediate successes may realistically be expected. Devarajan et al., (2001) present the 
evidence of poor returns to investment in Africa with cross-country data, and argue that “the 
much-denigrated capital flight out of Africa may well have been a rational response to low 
returns at home (p.98).” Lensink and White (1998) estimated the probability of a developing 
country attracting significant private capital inflows, and found that such probability was 
very low for almost all African countries. The World Bank and IMF (2005) lucidly describe 
poor governance, inadequate infrastructure, high security risks, and other weak investment 
climate, all of which remain firmly entrenched and depressed risk-adjusted rates of return on 
private investment to the unacceptably low levels.       
 
Nevertheless, the differences in modalities of aid delivery between Asia and Africa—and the 
statistical evidence that suggests that modality matters—suggest several modifications of the 
current aid strategy in Africa: 
 
First, the scale of aid to recipient countries. In Asia, aid was small and mostly for 
infrastructure, so one needed not to worry about Dutch Decease and other potential adverse 
macroeconomic consequences. This is not the case for many countries in Africa.  
 
It will be critical to continue to support sound macroeconomic policies and good governance. 
However, for countries with large aid inflows and ample international reserves, the support 
should be extended without financing (a la IMF’s new Policy Support Instrument). For others, 
IMF’s traditional balance of payment support would be appropriate. Namely, the funding 
should not be used to finance increased government spending but to augment international 
reserves.
15 The policy program should feature a heightened focus on promoting long-term 
growth, possibly including increasing private investment and lowering real interest rates as 
performance targets. 
 
                                                 
15  The IMF (2005) endorses a policy of not using part of aid and “saving” it in increased international 
reserves as a short-run choice, for countries with large aid inflows and low international reserves. While 
this policy may make sense from narrow interests of the recipient country, it may not be fully appropriate 
from global perspectives. Surely, there must be some poor countries where aid is in short supply and is 
badly needed to meet immediate humanitarian or developmental needs. Moreover, most donor countries 
are facing a very difficult fiscal situation.  - 19 - 
Radelete (2004) recommends that donors “begin to allocate aid more seriously to poor 
countries with strong and moderate governance” and that “well-governed countries ... should 
receive more of their aid as program funding (p.1).” “Well-governed countries” are already 
receiving the large amount of aid, much of it in program aid. A pre-condition before moving 
further in this direction should be enhancement of supply response to policy programs on the 
basis of which program aid is given. A more definitive progress in improving a business 
environment more conducive to private investment is imperative. Otherwise, a further 
increase in aid-financed demand on non-tradables would harm private investment by leading 
to real exchange rate appreciation or an increase in real interest rates. 
 
Second, the composition of aid. The focus on immediate social needs is entirely appropriate 
in aid to Africa, given the immediate needs to attend to dire living conditions such as poor 
health, a lack of safe water, and low primary school enrolment. However, the balance may 
have shifted too far in that direction at the expense of long-term development objectives, 
including economic infrastructure. In redirecting aid for infrastructure, aid agencies should 
take steps not to repeat mistakes of the past—poor maintenance and white elephants. Greater 
accountability and full ownership will be essential. As was practiced in many projects in Asia, 
involvement of private investors as a co-financier will provide greater scrutiny in designing, 
implementation and maintenance of infrastructure projects. 
 
Actually, if implemented well, aid projects in social sectors should complement long-term 
economic goals. A better-trained, healthier work force is essential to attract FDI and latch 
onto the global value chain. However, to ensure a more lasting result, greater accountability 
and ownership are needed. A possible step in this direction may be to give program aid to 
local communities to fund social projects they select and implement. The funding should be 
contingent upon a modest cost sharing by local communities, to ensure full ownership and 
long-term commitment. A more radical possibility may be to give aid vouchers to the poor. 
This possibility is usually dismissed, but IFC (2005) argues that aid vouchers “aim at 
providing purchasing power and choice to those who need it most, when they need it, with a 
minimum of waste and misdirection.  
   
Finally, the size of individual projects and donor involvement. In Asia, donor projects were 
generally large, and donors were engaged in a limited number of projects in each recipient 
country. The opposite is the case in Africa. Much efficiency gains can be made by allowing 
larger projects, including for infrastructure, and by scaling down the intensity of donor 





The goal of the donor community in Africa is laudable and deserves support. Radelete (2004) 
shows that the new, large private aid institutions are succeeding in achieving their narrowly 
defined social targets (such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tb). The World Bank and the IMF (2005) 
argued that “large increases in aid will be needed, particularly to accelerate progress towards 
the non-income MDGs (p.20).” - 20 - 
 
However, if we are to agree that perpetual dependency on aid is not good for the Africans, 
then it should be delivered in such a way that would lessen the need for it over time. Aid 
should eventually lead to self-sustained development. In Africa, the balance has shifted too 
far in favor of short-term social needs at the expense of real development objectives. 
 
There is little convincing evidence that suggests that aid has contributed significantly to 
economic growth in Africa over the last three decades. While the recent upturn in economic 
performance in many African countries is encouraging, over a longer horizon, even “good 
performers”—for which large program and other aid were given—have not achieved better 
results than others. Life expectancy has continued to fall at an alarming pace in many 
countries.  
 
A buoyant private sector is a prerequisite for continual economic growth and poverty 
reduction. In Africa, aid does not seem to have catalyzed private investment, which remains 
pitifully low. In contrast, the existing literature and anecdotal evidence suggest that aid 
contributed modestly to the phenomenal growth in East Asia. The key was that aid leveraged 
a larger amount of private investment. Aid was not large but combined with other means of 
public intervention strategically designed to achieve this goal. Building on this experience, 
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Table 1. GMM Estimate for GDI: All Regions 
 
 
Aid to All regions 
Aid to Asia, Africa and Others as 
separate variables 



































































































































































































































































Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆GDI. The robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; 
***1% level significance. Time dummies are included. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  - 22 - 
Table 2. GMM Estimate for FDI: All Regions 
 
 
Aid to All regions 
Aid to Asia, Africa and Others as 
separate variables 




































































































































































































































































Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆FDI. The robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; 
***1% level significance. Time dummies are included. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Average 529.7 1.3% 4 7.5 1.3 70.0% 12.9%

































































Source: CRS/Aid Activities. 
Note: Including only donors with total aid commitment of more than $50 millions in the 
period 1973-1989.  -  24  -   
Table 4. GMM Estimate for FDI on Aid: Asia
1 
 
   
With Non-aid Explanatory Variables 
 
With Aid Variables Only 






















































































































































































Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆FDI. The robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; ***1% level 
significance. Time dummies are included.  
 
1/Including Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.       
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Table 5. GMM Estimate for GDI on Aid: Asia
1 
 
   
With Non-aid Explanatory Variables 
 
With Aid Variables Only 


























































































































































































Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆GDI. The robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; ***1% level 
significance. Time dummies are included. 
 
1/Including Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.       
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Table 6. GMM Estimate for Japanese Aid and FDI in Asia
1 
 
Dependent Variable  ∆Japanese FDI  ∆FDI 























































































































































































































Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆FDI (only Japanese or 
total investment). The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% 
level significance; ***1% level significance. Time dummies are included. 
 
1/Including Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, The 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Table 7. Growth Regression by Economic Planning Agency 
    
Variable Coef.   
ln(Initial GDP)  -0.01   
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.56
**  




Oil shock periods  -2.11
**  
Financial depth (-1)  0.04
**  
Fiscal surplus (-1)  0.09
**  
Inflation (-1)  -0.01
**  
Economic openness  2.02
**  
Yen loans per GDP (-1)  0.23
**  




No. of obs.  2,019   
No. of group  100   
Adj. R-squared  0.26   
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.52   
S.E. of regression  5.33   
** 5% significance level. 
Note: Although the choice of variables follows the 
previous literature in this area, this estimation 
result seems to depend on a different data 
treatment. Each data point might be a year-country 
observation, though no details are explained in the 
original paper. The conventional treatment is to 
take the four or five-year average in order to avoid 
a short-term volatility in the variables. 
 
Source: Economic Planning Agency (2001).  
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Average size Median size
Average aid 
flows  per year 
(in 2003 USD 
millions)
Median aid flows 
per year (in 2003 
USD millions)
1980-89
France 514 44 11.7 1,138              267                 44.3 15.5
Germany 68 39 1.7 4,622              2,345              17.6 12.8
Italy 63 40 1.6 5,853              1,502              12.4 4.8
Japan 72 42 1.7 4,405              2,268              15.0 7.3
Netherlands 117 40 2.9 1,282              522                 8.2 2.7
United Kingdom 29 22 1.3 3,375              1,101              26.2 14.8
United States 140 42 3.3 2,272              1,318              32.9 15.5
1990-99
France 445 49 9.1 1,733              442                 51.9 19.8
Germany 151 48 3.1 2,916              1,060              23.7 19
Italy 201 48 4.2 1,047              165                 9.3 3.3
Japan 106 47 2.3 5,681              3,239              19.4 9.3
Netherlands 384 45 8.5 802                 140                 11.3 5
United Kingdom 244 42 5.8 1,559              477                 15.2 2.9
United States 275 47 5.9 1,888              792                 24.2 13.8
2000-03
France 1081 50 21.6 633                 151                 26.8 10.9
Germany 715 48 14.9 813                 182                 14.4 12.1
Italy 431 45 9.6 246                 23                   3.4 0.8
Japan 325 47 6.9 1,085              72                   13.6 6.0
Netherlands 602 44 13.7 639                 64                   13.9 5.7
United Kingdom 453 42 10.8 1,532              232                 22.8 2.4
United States 774 48 16.1 1,163              343                 33.1 18.3
Source: CRS/Aid Activities.   
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Angola  313.3  3.5 26.0 44.4 2.8 22.8  3.9
Benin  261.4  11.3  34.0 59.0 5.5 0.3 1.2
Botswana 149.0  3.0 39.3 55.1 3.2 1.4 1.0
Burkina Faso 455.2  13.9  34.7 60.3 3.3 0.5 1.3
Burundi  250.8  20.1  29.4 54.5 2.5 13.0  0.6
Cameroon 500.3  4.1 26.4 47.4 25.0 0.3 0.9
Cape Verde  131.4  27.2  32.5 64.3 0.5 1.6 1.2
Central African Rep.  186.8  13.2  47.2 46.7 4.4 0.4 1.3
Chad 254.9  14.5  39.1 56.3 2.2 1.6 0.8
Comoros  58.7 20.8  37.3 58.9 2.2 1.3 0.3
Congo Dem.Rep.  604.7  5.3 20.1 24.1 45.7 5.2 4.9
Congo, Rep. 174.4  5.9 27.2 50.0 16.7 3.5 2.5
Cote d'Ivoire  614.3  5.0 22.6 50.0 25.1 0.5 1.7
Equatorial Guinea  41.7 7.3 38.1 57.3 3.6 0.1 0.8
Ethiopia 1005.2 11.8  34.7 47.6 3.0 12.1  2.6
Gabon 128.4  2.1 33.0 46.1 18.9 0.8 1.1
Gambia  101.6  23.2  39.9 56.1 2.1 0.7 1.2
Ghana  696.0  6.0 43.5 51.0 3.4 0.2 2.0
Guinea 336.2  9.9 41.9 50.3 5.7 2.0 0.2
Guinea-Bissau 122.3  41.6  30.4 46.5 20.0 1.9 1.2
Kenya  884.6  7.8 42.8 47.6 5.8 2.3 1.5
Lesotho 145.1  15.3  42.1 54.7 0.8 0.6 1.8
Madagascar  461.2  10.3  37.1 46.9 13.5 0.7 1.7
Malawi 466.0  23.3  28.6 64.4 3.4 2.0 1.6
Mali 544.1  16.3  32.8 61.1 3.8 0.9 1.4
Mauritius  79.5 2.1 54.7 44.7 0.1 0.3 0.3
Mozambique 949.7  23.3  27.3 48.3 19.2 3.7 1.4
Namibia  110.0  3.5 32.8 63.7 0.0 1.3 2.1
Niger 400.2  14.6  30.7 62.5 5.0 1.0 0.8
Nigeria 226.4  0.5 25.3 71.0 2.7 0.6 0.4
Rwanda  399.5  16.9  26.7 57.7 1.9 11.6  2.0
Sao Tome & Principe  38.7 61.7  37.6 48.2 12.8 0.7 0.7
Senegal  703.2  12.2  32.1 57.2 9.0 0.3 1.3
Seychelles  28.3 5.1 39.1 51.2 5.8 0.4 3.5
Sierra Leone  194.2  15.6  20.8 42.9 20.2 12.8  3.3
South Africa  234.9  0.2 13.7 84.3 0.0 0.5 1.5
Swaziland 62.0 4.8 47.1 49.9 0.2 0.9 2.0
Tanzania  1233.6 13.5  40.2 45.4 12.0 1.7 0.8
Togo 196.0  10.6  36.6 51.5 10.4 0.7 0.7
Uganda  663.9  10.4  28.2 63.3 4.8 2.7 1.0
Zambia 733.4  17.4  30.0 52.2 15.5 0.9 1.3
Zimbabwe  434.6  4.0 28.1 61.7 2.3 6.3 1.6
Simple average 370.9 12.8  33.6 53.7 8.2 2.9 1.5
Median 254.9 11.3  33.0 51.5 4.4 0.9 1.3
Source: CRS/Aid Activities. 
Aid flows Sectoral distribution (% of all commitments) 
1/ Includes: Economic infrastructures and services: transport and storage, communications, energy, banking and financing services, business and other 
services; Production: agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry and construction, and trade and tourism. 
2/ Includes: Social infrastructures and services: education, health, population program, water supply and sanitation, government and civil society, other 
social infrastructure and services and multi-sector projects; Program assistance: structural adjustment (with IBRD/IMF), food aid excluding relief food 
aid, and other general programme and commodity assistance.
Other commitment
Social services 
infras. & program 
aid 2/
Action relating to 
debt
Emergency aid -  30  -   
 
Table 10. Improvement of HDI and per capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980–2003 
 
 
Aid weighted average 1/ Simple average
Human development index
All SSA countries 11.8 11.4
SSA excl. conflict cases 2/ 10.7 10.7
SSA excl. AIDS cases 3/ 12.6 13.8
Per capita GDP
All SSA countries 2.9 7.3
SSA excl. conflict cases 6.4 15.3
SSA excl. AIDS cases 0.3 -0.2
Source: World Development Indicators
1/ Average change in per capita GDP of aid recipients, weighted by share of the recipient  
in total aid of donor to Sub-Saharan Africa. Excluding countries for which per capita 
GDP was not available. 
2/ Countries affected by conflicts are those with a share of emergency aid that is at least 
16 percent of total aid (1995-2003): Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Liberia Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. 
3/ Countries affected by AIDS are: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland. -  31  -   
 
Table 11. Improvement in HDI of Countries with Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 







Average of countries with SAP  
 

























































1/ Countries that received SAP aid in at least 8 of 11 years, and for which HDI data 
is available  
2/ Excluding AIDS cases: Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa & Swaziland. 
Sources: HDI- Human development report 2004 (UNDP); SAP- OECD 
CRS/Aid Activities – All Commitments – All Details: 1973 – 2004.  -  32  -   
Table 12. GMM Estimate for FDI on Aid: Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
   
With Non-aid Explanatory Variables 
 
With Aid Variables Only 





















































































































































































































        Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆FDI. The robust standard  
        errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; ***1% level  
        significance. Time dummies are included. 
 
         Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Table 13. GMM Estimate for GDI on Aid: Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
   
With Non-aid Explanatory Variables 
 
With Aid Variables Only 






















































































































































































































        Note: The one step estimation is performed with the dependent variable of ∆GDI. The robust standard  
        errors are shown in parentheses. *10% level significance; **5% level significance; ***1% level  
        significance. Time dummies are included.  
 
        Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Table 14. Private Investment before and after Structural Adjustment Programs 
(in percent of GDP) 
 

























[1] Countries that received SAP aid in at least 7 of 9 years.
Excluding Chad whose economic indicators were influenced by the construction of oil pipeline. 
Sources: 
Per capita GDP- World Development Indicators 
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Table 15. Domestic Liquidity Impact, 1995–2003 










reserve money Inflation rate 
Real rate of 
interest
Change in Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 3/
     Benin  9.4 2.0 1.2 4.6 -  3.4
     Burkina Faso 13.6 1.9 1.2 3.2 -  1.7
     Cape Verde  20.1 1.0 1.6 4.0 8.4  0.8
     Comoros  12.8 2.4 1.9 3.0 -  1.3
     Ethiopia  14.1 0.7 1.1 2.8 8.1  -1.9
     Gambia  11.9 -1.1 3.1 5.2 20.0 -5.8
     Ghana  10.1 1.3 3.2 29.0 -  -0.6
     Madagascar  9.6 0.9 1.2 13.4 15.1 2.2
     Malawi  23.0 0.5 1.6 31.8 15.0 1.4
     Mali  13.7 2.6 2.1 3.0 -  -0.6
     Mozambique  25.1 - 1.4 17.9 -  1.4
     Niger  12.8 0.8 0.5 3.2 -  -0.9
     Senegal  9.5 2.1 1.2 2.3 -  1.5
     Tanzania  11.5 2.3 0.9 11.4 13.1 -3.8
     Uganda  12.2 1.4 0.8 4.7 16.2 1.0
     Zambia  18.0 - 1.5 27.2 16.0 13.4
Average  14.2 1.3 1.5 10.4 14.0 0.9
  Sources: IMF, African Department database, and WEO database.
2/ A negative sign indicates decrease. 
3/ A negative sign indicates depreciation. 
1/ Countries with social sector projects and program aid exceeding 5 percent of GDP. Excluding Chad and Guinea-Bissau.  -  36  -   
Figure 1. Aid Flows in East Asia  



















Indonesia           
Korea




Source: DAC and WEO 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Impulse Response of GDI to Aid  
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Figure 4. Distribution (Lorenz Curve) of Japanese Aid among Recipients in 
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   1/ Including all African countries for which data is available. 
   Sources: IFS and WEO databases. 
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Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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Since all dependent and independent variables are potentially endogenous in our case, one of 
the conventional Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators, the Arrelano-Bond 




j j j it
p
j j j it it c c x y y ε β α + + + + = ∑ ∑ = − = − 0 1 '                                                                              (1) 
 
where yit is a dependent variable, which is either foreign direct investment to country i at 
period t (FDIit), or gross domestic investment  in country i at period t (GDIit). The 
independent variables, xit , include aid (Aidit) and other relevant variables. Since the impact of 
aid is potentially nonlinear, aid squared is introduced as an additional independent variable. 
The individual country and the period specific fixed effects, ci and ct , respectively, are also 
incorporated in the estimated equation. Time dummies are included for all specifications. 
 
By taking the first difference, the equation becomes:  
 
) ( ' 1 0 1 − = − = − − + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∑ ∑ it it t
q
j j j it
p
j j j it it c x y y ε ε β α                                                                   (2) 
 
Under the assumption that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
idiosyncratic errors, the lagged levels of the dependent and independent variables can be 
considered to be valid instruments.  
 
In principle, xit should include all relevant country-specific characteristics that affect capital 
investment. We have investigated four of such variables for which time series data are fully 
available: population as a proxy for market size; per capita GDP (constant 2000 US$) as a 
proxy for labor cost; he number of subscribers to fixed-line and mobile phones (per 1,000 
people) as a proxy for infrastructure; and exports of natural resources per GDP as a proxy for 
resource richness. The last variable was meant to capture the feature that some African 
countries with abundant natural resources would likely attract foreign investment but not 
receive much aid. In general, however, this variable has been found irrelevant to the aid-
investment relationship and thus dropped from our analyses.
16  
                                                 
16 The selection of these variables mainly follows the existing literature on foreign investment location, which 
generally suggests that FDI tends to be determined by host country’s domestic market size, its ability to export 
in the regional area, relative labor costs, the quality of infrastructural facilities, and industrial agglomeration 
(e.g., Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Cieslik and Ryan, 2004; Farrell, et al., 2004; Milner, et al., forthcoming).  -  43  -     
 
 
Moreover, when these independent variables are introduced, the degree of freedom is 
reduced to the extent that precludes the possibility of incorporating aid in three regions (Asia, 
Africa, and the other regions) as separate variables. For these reasons, the models in which 
only the aid variable is adopted in xit are estimated as well. This allows us to focus on the 
bivariate relationship between investment and aid flows. 
 
While the GMM model presumably controls for the country-specific fixed effect, the cross-
country literature in this area has shown that the estimates tend to be sensitive to potential 
country-specific heterogeneity. Thus, the robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the parameters is used in this paper. In fact, it was found that the standard errors are quite 
different when assuming a homoskedastic error term. This can be interpreted as the presence 
of a heteroskedastic error term. Under the assumption of heteroskedasticity, the conventional 
Sargan statistics cannot be calculated.  
 
Taking into account the fact that investment has a considerable degree of persistence over 
time, the model is specified with 3 lags for the dependent variable (p=3). However, when the 
sample is limited to a particular region, the length of lags is more restricted because of an 




The current analysis uses data from 111 developing countries, for which historical 
macroeconomic statistics are available. The sample period covers 1972-2003, which is 
divided into 8 four-year periods: 1972-75, 1976-79, 1980-83, 1984-87, 1988-91, 1992-95, 
1996-99, and 2000-03, following the conventional treatment in the existing literature. Taking 
the four-year averages will be instrumental in mitigating measurement errors caused by 
short-term economic fluctuations.  
 
For the aid-FDI equation, the dependent variable, FDI, is defined in percent of GDP.
17 In the 
aid-to-GDI equation, the share of GDI in GDP is used for the dependent variable.
18 Both FDI 
and GDI data are sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. For the aid 
variable, the existing literature indicates that the empirical aid effects may be sensitive to the 
choice of variables (e.g., Easterly, 2003). One of the conventional measurements is the 
amount of net aid in terms of GDP (e.g., Hansen and Tarp, 2001).
19 However, as far as the 
                                                 
17 By definition, FDI is net inflows of foreign capital to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock), such as equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long- and short-term capital. 
18 Although the focus of this paper is the private component of gross domestic investment, the latter (GDI) was 
selected as the dependent variable. This is because it has been found that private investment is highly correlated 
with its lagged values. This property may make the GMM estimator biased and unstable (Blundell, et al., 2000).   
19 For aid variables, Burnside and Dollar (2000) use the World Bank’s Effective Development Assistance 
database, where the grant component of each concessional loan is combined with outright grants. On the other 
(continued)  -  44  -     
 
aid-to-investment linkage is concerned, aid may be better measured by total grants and gross 
loans minus debt forgiveness and reorganized debt equivalence, because the last two types of 
aid would unlikely contribute directly to investment in the real economy. All aid data depend 
on OECD’s International Development Statistics.  
 
The summary statistics is shown in Table A.1. Overall, the average of FDI per GDP is 
2.6 percent, and the domestic investment ratio averages 23.1 percent. Aid received by 
developing countries amounts to 9 percent of GDP, but this may vary largely across countries. 
Some seldom rely on foreign aid, and others are heavily dependent on aid that may exceed 
100 percent of GDP. Of particular note, these figures may differ among regional areas. In 
Asia, for instance, aid dependency is relatively low compared with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
While the aid to GDP ratio in Asia is only 2.4 percent on average, the ratio for African 
countries reaches 14 percent. On the other hand, domestic investment in Asia is larger than 
that in SSA. Thus, African countries had granted a relatively large amount of aid but might 
not use it for capital formulation in the economy.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
hand, another alternative may be aid per capita, which is consistent with growth theory (Trumbull and Wall, 
1994; Alesina and Weder, 2002).   -  45  -     
 
 
Table A.1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All regions
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 1153 2.61 14.72 -11.87 481.99
Gross domestic investment (GDI) 1226 23.12 8.43 2.95 90.28
Effective aid 1021 8.96 12.19 0.00 113.90
    Of which: Japanese aid  967 0.74 1.79 0.00 22.38
                      Other aid 967 8.31 11.44 0.00 107.17
Asia 1/
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 84 1.28 1.78 -1.62 8.09
    Of which: Japanese FDI 74 0.31 0.36 0.00 1.58
Gross domestic investment (GDI) 85 25.24 7.25 6.73 40.58
Effective aid 83 2.40 2.43 0.01 10.22
    Of which: Japanese aid  83 0.62 0.54 0.00 2.88
                      Other aid 83 1.77 2.08 0.01 8.16
Sub-Saharan Africa
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 338 2.10 5.14 -6.43 62.20
Gross domestic investment (GDI) 331 20.38 9.93 2.95 90.28
Effective aid 339 14.08 14.14 0.00 113.90
    Of which: Japanese aid  320 0.56 0.76 0.00 6.73
                      Other aid 320 13.80 13.88 0.10 107.17
Note: The variables are in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated. 
1/ Including Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.   
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